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SALAZAR’S INTERFERENCE IN THE BBC PORTUGUESE SERVICE 





This article presents a case study on the limits of the BBC Overseas Service’s 
journalistic independence during World War II. Not only editorial policy but also 
the personnel hired by the BBC Portuguese Service were subject to pressure 
from Salazar through the Foreign Office. How the Lisbon government was made 
aware of the events taking place inside the Portuguese Service and which 
strategies were used to interfere in its editorial line are discussed. This history 
presents clear evidence of how the BBC was required to trim its output in order 
to avoid diplomatic problems arising between the British and the Portuguese 
governments. 
 






British shortwave broadcasts in Portuguese to Portugal started on 4 
June 1939 and were monitored very carefully by Oliveira Salazar’s dictatorship 
(known as the Estado Novo – or “New State” in English). The Portuguese 
authoritarian regime was different to all others since the Head of Government 
did not see the State as an omnipotent entity. The arrangement was that the 
State’s power should be limited by Catholic morals so that, unlike Nazism, it 
would not be permeated with an “aggressive, excessive, hateful nationalism” 
(Salazar, 1937, p. 285). Even so, the Estado Novo was marked by weak liberal 
principles and strong corporatist and authoritarian elements (Pinto, 2005, p. 26) 
which led Braga da Cruz to define it as “a baptised fascism” (Cruz, 1980, p. 
306). Although the Constitution approved in 1933 established a series of rights, 
including the freedom of expression, individual rights were in practice always 
very limited and censorship was used to avoid the dissemination of ideas that 
were not in accordance to the regime’s ideology.   
Salazar was partially responsible for the BBC’s enormous success in 
Portugal. If it had not been for his censorship-based media policies the public 
could have relied on news aired by the local stations or published in the local 
press. However, since both newspapers and radio stations only reported the 
news permitted by the censors, a thirst for more news was created and it could 
only be satisfied by listening to foreign stations and of those broadcasting to 
Portugal the BBC was “by far the most popular” (Foreign Office internal report, 
1944, National Archives, FO 371/39616). 
The huge success of the BBC in Portugal, which can be attributed to its 
high level of credibility and to a basic Anglophile sentiment among the 
Portuguese, led the Lisbon regime to carefully scrutinise the content of the 
broadcasts. The Embassy in London was particularly active in maintaining 
good contacts inside the BBC and in making suggestions regarding its editorial 
line. 
 
The Case of Armando Cortesão 
 
The dismissal of the anti-Salazar political refugee Armando Cortesão 
from the BBC is the most egregious example of Salazar’s interference in the 
Portuguese Service. After a period working for the Brazilian section, Cortesão 
had become a translator in the Portuguese Section in 1941 and was also 
responsible for editing some of the scripted talks aired on the broadcasts 
(Foreign Office memorandum, October 1941, National Archives, FO 
371/26819). In addition, besides his work at the Corporation, he regularly wrote 
for the Lisbon magazine Seara Nova, in which his articles were frequently 
censored.1 He quickly became a scapegoat used by the Lisbon government to 
demand a change in the editorial line of the BBC’s Portuguese Service. 
The Estado Novo’s concern with the role of Armando Cortesão inside the 
BBC existed prior to the launch of the Portuguese Service. In a letter addressed 
to Salazar, on 3 March 1939, the Ambassador in London, Armindo Monteiro, 
openly expressed his fear that Cortesão would become a staff member of the 
Portuguese Service. Known for his opposition to the Estado Novo’s ideology, 
Cortesão had been sentenced in absentia in 1934 (Diário da Manhã, 1941a) for 
the attempted overthrow of Salazar. He was among a group of more than one 
thousand anti-fascist Portuguese of the political and military elites who sought 
exile in Spain. His brother Jaime Cortesão, besides being a highly regarded 
intellectual, was “the favoured orator of the Spanish republican authorities, the 
‘voice’ of the Portuguese exiles against the Salazar regime” (Oliveira, 1987, p. 
228).2  
By March 1939, Cortesão was already working at the Brazilian Section; 
and the possibility of his transition to the Portuguese Service that was then 
being organized worried Armindo Monteiro: 
 
It would be no surprise if the B.B.C., in regard to the case of direct 
interest to us, and for economic reasons, just tried to expand the 
services of its Brazilian section. Employed in that section, and in a 
position of some prominence [...] sheltered by the B.B.C.’s own left-
wing tendencies, is the Portuguese political refugee Armando 
Cortezão, the infamous editor of a notorious secret pamphlet totally 
filled with lies [...]. I don’t really know if the British, with their usual 
incomprehension of the political intricacies of other peoples, will 
now comprehend the gaffe that they would commit by placing in a 
position of prominence in a news service intended to capture the 
support of a certain people and a certain government… a political 
refugee of such moral perfection! Let’s hope that they understand 
(Letter from Monteiro to Salazar, 3 March 1939, Historic Diplomatic 
Archive, M.97 CP). 
 
It was in response to this letter that Salazar himself asked Monteiro to 
express to the Foreign Office the dim view the Lisbon government would take 
of the appointment of Cortesão to the Portuguese Section. In reply, the Chief of 
the News Department of the Foreign Office guaranteed that the new Service 
would not be run by Cortesão (Historic Diplomatic Archive, M.97 CP and M.248 
CP). At the time, this response was considered to be sufficient by the 
Portuguese government. Nevertheless, during 1941 when Cortesão was 
responsible for the translation of a broadsheet in Portuguese which advertised 
the BBC programmes, his presence inside the Corporation gave rise to a 
serious diplomatic incident. The BBC was well aware of the fact that the 
employment of Cortesão was a very sensitive matter which explains an internal 
discussion that took place in April and May 1941 about the possible transfer of 
Cortesão to the Overseas Publicity section; but this did not occur (BBC Written 
Archives, R13/199/2).  
A few months later, in September, there were rumours regarding the 
possibility of Cortesão being put in charge of the Portuguese Service3 which 
again irritated Salazar and his government. Moreover, the rumour was spread 
during a very sensitive period for British propaganda efforts since Hitler’s 
invasion of Russia had been well received by some of the more conservative 
Portuguese elites. It was a particular easy time for rumours against the 
Corporation.  
Due to his past and his political ideas, Cortesão was known for 
disagreeing with the friendly tone that the BBC, in accordance to the British 
government’s policy, had adopted in regards to the Estado Novo.4 He was 
known to have written to some of his friends in Portugal urging them “to criticise 
the BBC’s policy, in the hope that it will be modified in a sense unfavourable to 
Dr. Salazar” (Foreign Office report, October 1941, National Archives, FO 
371/39616). Some of these letters had been intercepted by the political police in 
Lisbon, making the regime even more concerned about his influence inside the 
BBC.  
The Foreign Office was, at the time, well aware of the starting point for 
the storm that then developed. In October, the Foreign Office notified the BBC 
of its concern regarding “the Portuguese authorities’ resentment of the 
employment of the political exile, Dr. Cortesão” (Letter from Roberts (F.O.) to 
Kirkpatrick (BBC), 29 October 1941, National Archives, FO 371/26819). The 
timing of this storm was also bad on the domestic front in Portugal, since local 
council elections were scheduled to take place on 19 October and, obviously, 
the regime became even less tolerant of anyone expressing ideas that were not 
in accordance with the status quo. 
Salazar himself instructed the censors to suppress all agency messages 
that contained any kind of British propaganda, which led to a change in the 
newspapers tone. The press had been receiving a combined Reuters and 
Exchange Telegraph service since August 1941, which meant that the quantity 
and quality of the messages received and published from British sources had 
grown considerably (Letter from Munro (Ministry of Information) to Markins 
(F.O.), 12 February 1942, National Archives, FO 371/31113). Nevertheless, 
following the instructions given by the Head of the Government, the efficiency of 
the censors, in terms of suppressing messages of British origin, became very 
apparent. A telegram from the Embassy in Lisbon to the Foreign Office testifies 
how radical this suppression was by the month of October:  
 
Censorship during the past five days has banned British 
photographs and severely cut the British news service. Censor 
told the Press Attaché that this action had been taken on direct 
instructions from Salazar who wishes thus to mark his resentment 
at “the change of tone of the BBC’s Portuguese transmissions”. In 
reply to enquiry in what respect there had been change, the 
Censor said that there had of late been noticeable absence of any 
complimentary reference to the Portuguese Government and he 
went on to speak of Portuguese exile in London, named Cortesão, 
employed as translator by the BBC (Telegram from Balfour (British 
Embassy) to F.O., 15 October 1941, National Archives, FO 
371/26819). 
 
The case of Armando Cortesão was made known to the Portuguese 
public through an editorial published in the semi-official newspaper Diário da 
Manhã, on 11 October. Carried on the front page, the text very strongly 
criticized those who, calling themselves Portuguese, were using foreign 
propaganda to attack the Estado Novo. Despite never mentioning the name of 
Cortesão it was evident that his presence at the BBC was the reason for the 
article:  
 
Portugal has been [...] the victim, on some occasions, of pollution 
from those sources of foreign propaganda. But we have found in 
such cases, which are certainly few and far between, that they are 
almost always due to the abusive intervention of agents with 
malicious intent who, for reasons of sedition or resentment, seek 
to politically, economically and morally discredit us [...]. Some of 
those agents present themselves under Portuguese names [...]. 
We do not want to believe that there are Portuguese, with such 
privileged names, capable of using radio, foreign news agencies 
or press to attack the Government and the institutions, or to give a 
false impression of the people and their country (Diário da Manhã, 
1941b). 
 
This article, along with the instructions given to the censors to suppress 
news from British sources, led Marcus Cheke, Press Attaché of the British 
Embassy in Lisbon, to speak directly to the Head of Censorship, Major Álvaro 
Barreto. During the conversation, which took place on 14 October, Cheke 
explained that Cortesão did not have any influence in the editorial orientation of 
the BBC broadcasts, since he was merely a translator. This, however, was not 
enough to bring the incident to an end and the Portuguese press continued to 
write about the matter. On 17 October, O Século published an article on its front 
page which commented on the harm that anti-Portuguese propaganda could 
have. It never mentioned the Cortesão case or the BBC, but for readers who 
knew of the situation it was clear that the article was criticizing some of the 
BBC’s features broadcast to Portugal.  
With the help of the press, the Estado Novo managed to create the 
perception in a section of public opinion that it was owing to Cortesão’s 
influence that the Corporation was now addressing issues in its Portuguese 
Service that were not well received by the regime, namely news and comments 
on Russia (O Século, 1941) considered a sensitive matter for the Lisbon regime 
due to its anti-communist ideology. By combining the usage of the press, direct 
censorship and diplomatic pressure the Estado Novo tried to influence the 
British broadcasts to Portugal. Its aim was not only to accomplish the dismissal 
of Cortesão but also to influence the overall tone of the broadcasts and remove 
material it did not like.  
The censorship became so severe in blocking British news and 
photographs that it was not long before the Embassy in Lisbon suggested that 
the BBC should give in to Salazar’s demand and dismiss Armando Cortesão. 
The requests to the Foreign Office on this matter were quite insistent: 
 
I consider that in the light of the incident the BBC would be well 
advised to respond as soon as possible to the recommendations 
recently made by the Press Office that they should cease to 
employ Cortesão in any capacity (Telegram from Balfour (British 
Embassy) to F.O., 15 October 1941, National Archives, FO 
371/26819). 
 
Following this recommendation the Ministry of Information confirmed that 
it was “endeavouring to remove Dr. Cortesão from the BBC” (Letter from 
McCann (Ministry of Information) to Markins (F.O.), 17 October 1941, National 
Archives, FO 371/26819). In the meanwhile, despite all the guarantees that 
were given about the non-interference of Cortesão on the editorial line of the 
Portuguese Service, his mere presence at the BBC was enough for Monteiro to 
suspect that the Corporation was intending to tinge its broadcasts “with hostility 
towards the [...] regime in Portugal” (Ibidem). 
Salazar acted on this information and, besides excising news from British 
sources he continued to use the press to disseminate information that harmed 
the BBC’s credibility in Portugal. On 20 October the Diário da Manhã 
readdressed the case, this time in more violent terms. Cortesão was described 
as an enemy of the Estado Novo who was using a foreign broadcaster to attack 
the Portuguese regime (Diário da Manhã, 1941c). Four days later the same 
newspaper published another front page editorial accusing the Portuguese 
Service of being steered by an enemy of the Estado Novo:  
 
[Foreign propaganda] is, if not managed or steered, then at least 
interfered with or manipulated by known and declared enemies of 
the Estado Novo. We would not be true to ourselves if we were not 
to publicly declare our astonishment in view of certain facts that 
have sadly been verified and confirmed (Diário da Manhã, 1941a). 
 
As the Embassy in Lisbon had informed the Foreign Office, flattery was 
very important to the Portuguese regime and this had also been “forgotten” by 
the BBC broadcasts. This was another argument used by Diário da Manhã to 
conclude that the service was being run by an opponent of the Portuguese 
regime. 
The article also presented a profile of Armando Cortesão, stating that he 
was a “well known enemy of the Estado Novo” who had been behind several 
attempts to overthrow the regime. Moreover, his character was attacked as he 
was accused of having committed several frauds and stealing money from his 
own brother and from funds that were destined to emigrants living in Corunha 
(Spain): 
 
From a moral viewpoint, Mr. Armando Cortesão, besides 
conspiring against a State for which he worked as an important 
civil servant, was accused by some emigrants of having used 
funds for revolutionary purposes or to aid the families of exiles for 
personal expenses. [...] His political friends also complain that 
when his brother Jaime Cortesão was in exile [...] the careful 
Armando lent him various sums of money with written receipts and 
then took possession of his goods to settle the debts, leaving his 
brother penniless. [...] This is enough to show the moral and 
political fibre of the man intending to direct or steer a Portuguese 
section of the BBC in London from behind the curtain! (Ibidem) 
 
This article, openly mentioning Cortesão’s interference in the BBC’s 
editorial line, motivated a severe protest from the British authorities which 
demanded that a denial be published the following day: 
 
His Majesty’s Embassy in Lisbon communicates the following: 
“The Diário da Manhã newspaper of the 24th of this month 
published an article containing news that it claims to be widely 
disseminated, this being that Dr. Armando Cortesão has been 
placed in charge of the BBC’s Propaganda Section for Portugal. 
This news article is, however, devoid of any foundation. Mr. 
Cortesão has never had any influence in the organisation of the 
BBC’s programmes for Portugal” (Diário da Manhã, 1941d). 
 
The text was printed on the front page, followed by a comment of the 
newspaper in which Diário da Manhã mentioned its own satisfaction at the fact 
that Cortesão was not in charge of the Portuguese Section. But, in any case, it 
added that “some attitudes of the BBC concerning Portugal remain to be 
explained” (Ibidem). 
The issue was addressed during the Corporation’s evening transmission 
to Portugal. The station presented an explanation and assured that Cortesão 
was merely a translator and therefore did not interfere in the editorial content of 
the broadcasts:  
 
... We categorically declare that Dr. Cortezão does not occupy 
any post in the Portuguese Section of the B.B.C. other than that 
of translator. Moreover, he has never had, at any time, any active 
voice in the management of the news or the programmes 
broadcast to Portugal (Transcription of the BBC news bulletin to 
Portugal, 25 October 1941, Oliveira Salazar Archive, 
AOS/CO/PC-3E). 
 
In the meanwhile, this situation was being exploited by German 
propaganda which was including “small complimentary references to the 
Portuguese government” (Telegram from Balfour to F.O., 18 October 1941, 
National Archives, FO 371/26819) in its broadcasts in order to create the idea 
that unlike London, Berlin had friendly relations with the Portuguese regime. 
The Berlin station accused the BBC of promoting personalities who only aimed 
to overthrow Salazar and his regime: 
 
Only a few days ago the Diário da Manhã, your governmental 
daily newspaper, complained that English propaganda broadcast 
in Portuguese was giving shelter to […] a Portuguese emigrant, 
traitor to the fatherland, who entertains himself, as your well 
regarded newspaper so states, by spreading, lies […] against 
Salazar’s Government and against the Estado Novo 
(Transcription of the German broadcast to Portugal, 27 October 
1941, Oliveira Salazar Archive, AOS/CO/PC-3E). 
 
As the suppression of news of British origin continued, the representative 
of the Exchange Telegraph in Lisbon contacted the Head of Censorship asking 
him to revise his attitude. The same request was made by the British Embassy 
in its contacts with the Lisbon authorities. The British Ambassador, Sir Ronald 
Campbell, though, considered that the solution for this diplomatic conflict should 
necessarily involve the dismissal of Armando Cortesão. He talked personally 
with Salazar on 29 October explaining his surprise and shock at the way the 
British news was being treated just because “an obscure employee of the 
British Broadcasting Corporation had written one or two foolish letters to his 
friends in Portugal” (Telegram from Campbell to Ministry of Information, 30 
October 1941, National Archives, FO 371/26819). Salazar did not deny that he 
himself had ordered the Censor to cut as much British news as possible and he 
even surprised Sir Ronald by stating that this was a response to a similar policy 
that was being followed by the London government: 
 
Dr. Salazar said that […] he had learnt that instructions had 
recently been given both to the English press and to the British 
Broadcasting Corporation to adopt a less friendly tone towards 
Portugal. He had therefore taken the step which I had described 
as Portugal would otherwise have been guilty of servility. When I 
had recovered from my amazement at this fantastic but typically 
Portuguese notion I replied that there must be some 
misunderstanding as I was quite certain that no such instructions 
as he had referred to had been given. […] Can you furnish me with 
some categorical denial which will help me to bring this ridiculous 
incident to an end? (Ibidem) 
 
This idea expressed by Salazar, that the BBC, following instructions from 
the British government, had supposedly decided to adopt a less friendly tone 
towards Portugal, mainly arose because of the incident with Cortesão. He had 
history with Armindo Monteiro, when the latter had held the post of Colonial 
Secretary and the former worked as highly-ranked civil servant under him. A 
few months before the diplomatic incident arose, Cortesão had written a letter to 
Salazar in which he offered his services to help in the promotion of the Anglo-
Portuguese relations. Later on, on 13 August 1941, he asked to be received by 
Monteiro, whom he intended to inform of the letter sent to the Head of 
Government. However, the Ambassador refused to grant him an audience, 
which was considered by Salazar to be the correct response (Letter from 
Monteiro to Salazar, 14 August 1941, Historic Diplomatic Archive, M.151 CP). A 
few days later, Cortesão wrote to Monteiro lamenting his attitude (Letter from 
Cortesão to Monteiro, 16 August 1941, Historic Diplomatic Archive, M.151 CP). 
This letter, which must have irritated the Ambassador, made him more sensitive 
than ever to information concerning Cortesão’s role inside the BBC. Combined 
with the information that he would be put in charge of the Service and the 
German invasion of Russia, Monteiro was even more irritated. This confluence 
of events and attitudes explains the timing of this crisis.  
Cortesão was dismissed from the BBC on December 1941 as a result of 
all the political pressure. The matter was analysed at the Foreign Office and the 
Ministry of Information which had a direct interference in the foreign languages 
broadcasts since, unlike the Home Service, these were “financed not by the 
licence fee but by a direct grant from the Treasury” (Winston, 2005, p. 286). 
Both ministries agreed that it was “most undesirable that officials of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation should organise opposition to any policy which the 
Corporation is following on the instructions of His Majesty’s Government” 
(Letter from Ministry of Information to Under-Secretary of State F.O., 3 
November 1941, National Archives, FO 371/26819). At first the BBC did not 
accept the idea of dismissing Cortesão because he “was merely a translator of 
a broadsheet in Portuguese which advertises the BBC programmes and 
contains, in addition, a certain amount of reading material” (Ibidem). The 
Corporation also alleged that if Cortesão was removed immediately from the 
service the broadsheet would have to be discontinued (Letter from BBC to 
Radcliffe (Ministry of Information), 1 November 1941, BBC Written Archives, 
E2/490). Nevertheless, despite this resistance to governmental interference, 
replacements for Cortesão were arranged (Telegram from Campbell to F.O., 22 
November 1941, National Archives, FO 371/26819) through the British 
Embassy in Lisbon and he was officially dismissed on 4 December (Telegram 
from Cortesão to Casimiro, 18 December 1941, National Archives, FO 
371/26819). 
The BBC made no arguments as regards its independence but the 
Minister of Information was subsequently questioned in the House of Commons 
regarding the independence of the staff working at the Portuguese Section of 
the BBC at that time. According to Armindo Monteiro, “Mr. Cortezão made it 
known that the BBC’s current employees responsible for broadcasts in 
Portuguese are “fascists” and he found a way for a member of parliament to 
ask a question on the subject in Parliament” (Letter from Monteiro to Salazar, 
31 December 1941, Historic Diplomatic Archive, M.176C CP). This took place 
on 19 December:  
 
Mr. Ness Edwards asked the Minister of Information whether he 
will investigate both the nature of the broadcasts in Portuguese 
and the antecedents of those employees of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation responsible for these broadcasts? 
Mr. Thurtle - If my hon. Friend will be good enough to give me 
some more specific indication of the matters he has in mind I will 
cause inquiries to be made into them (Hansard parliamentary 
debates). 
 
The effect of this question was null and therefore Cortesão remained 
dismissed.  
 
Control over the Staff and Editorial Interference 
 
The intervention of the Lisbon authorities into the case of Armando 
Cortesão did not come as a surprise since from the start of the Service the 
British had allowed Portuguese interference via the Ambassador in London. He 
had cultivated good relations with those who worked at the BBC Portuguese 
Section. Moreover, only a few days following the official inauguration of the 
broadcasts to Portugal, the Lisbon regime had helped the BBC to solve a 
serious problem concerning the transmissions: the lack of qualified people 
available to work at Bush House with a good knowledge of both English and 
Portuguese. Following a request from the Ministry of Information in London 
Salazar had authorised three Portuguese civil servants to work as translators at 
the BBC (Letter from Director of the Foreign Publicity Directorate (Ministry of 
Information) to Monteiro, 10 September 1939, Historic Diplomatic Archive, M.97 
CP). This was a subtle way for the Estado Novo to maintain some leverage on 
the content of the broadcasts since it retained the possibility of calling the 
translators back to Lisbon, which could jeopardise the Portuguese Service.  
Later on, during 1941, the Chancellor of the Embassy was also one of 
the BBC translators. Commenting on this situation, which was a surprise even 
for Salazar, Ambassador Monteiro pressed the advantages of having a loyal 
person working in the Corporation:  
 
[...] I could not remain indifferent to the fact that such a situation 
might allow me to know in certain detail what was going on in the 
B.B.C. The Chancellor has shown total loyalty to the Embassy. It 
would be patently to our detriment to sever his connection to the 
B.B.C. […]. We would lose a source of information that has proven 
to be useful (Letter from Monteiro to Salazar, 31 October 1941, 
Historic Diplomatic Archive, M.143 CP). 
 
Salazar agreed that it was important strategically to maintain privileged 
sources of information on what was taking place inside the BBC and the 
Portuguese Section in particular. During the following year, Mrs. Frank Collin 
joined the BBC which also pleased Armindo Monteiro. An admirer of Salazar, 
she was an open advocate of the Estado Novo (Letter from Monteiro to 
Salazar, 15 May 1942, Historic Diplomatic Archive, M.76C CP) and a 
Portuguese speaker.  
In accordance with the policy of remaining on good relations with all 
those working in the Portuguese Section, Monteiro wrote to Salazar in 1942 
alerting the Portuguese authorities to a visit that Michael Winch, editor of the 
Portuguese Section, was scheduled to make to Portugal. He had taken the 
Service over at the end of the previous year:  
  
On leaving here he shall be placed in the care of the British 
Embassy. I think it might be necessary to attract his attention 
towards the Portuguese institutions, which may be able to 
generate a favourable impression in him, thus ensuring that he is 
not solely left abandoned to British influence. […] In the telegram I 
sent a few days ago I also mentioned that Mr. Winch was a figure 
deserving of the care of the National Propaganda Secretariat. The 
presence of the Secretariat should, in my view, ensure it interacts 
with him in a very discrete fashion, providing useful information but 
not seeking to captivate or control him. Mr. Winch is quite English 
in his manner: he is therefore horrified at propaganda and 
naturally believes it to solely be a means of moulding facts and 
ideas so as to give them the perspective most convenient to the 
interested party at that time. It would be important for Mr. Winch to 
return as our friend and interested in Portugal and the 
accomplishments of the regime (Letter from Monteiro to Salazar, 6 
October 1942, Historic Diplomatic Archive, M.76C CP). 
 
This level of interest in Michael Winch was not untypical given the 
editorial power the editors of the different BBC foreign services were deemed to 
exercise. Despite efforts to make the European Service act in accordance with 
agreed principles and lines, such was not the case most of the time. This is 
clearly recognized in a BBC internal directive which states that “not only do 
some editors follow their own line, but they actually adopt a line directly 
contrary to that which had been laid down” (Directive of 18 June 1942, quoted 
in Bennett,  1966, p. 83). Moreover, according to Asa Briggs, all members of 
staff, in addition to the editors, had some influence in the selection of news “and 
many of them had their own sense not only of what broadcasting could and 
could not do in a protracted war of what mattered and did not matter.” (Briggs, 
1970, p. 482). 
This explains Monteiro’s interest in maintaining good relations with all the 
members of the Portuguese Service, from the editors to typists. Of course, the 
announcers were also an interesting target for the Embassy because even 
when reading the news and talks written by British journalists and 
commentators in translation, their voice inflexions partially determined the 
meaning of the texts.  
Besides the good contacts that the Portuguese Ambassador maintained 
inside the BBC, the Portuguese Service was also infiltrated by Salazar’s 
supporters, namely Colonel Egerton who was one of the first British authors to 
produce scripts aired in the broadcasts to Portugal. His links with the Estado 
Novo preceded the outbreak of World War II. In 1939 he spent four months in 
Portugal, during which time he developed contacts with the main personalities 
of the regime. His trip took place after his recommendation by Armindo 
Monteiro, who considered him to be a friend of the Estado Novo.5 Following this 
visit Colonel Egerton wrote a book praising the Salazar regime. Entitled 
Recreation, Revolution or Re-Birth, it was published in Lisbon in 1940.  
In February 1941 Egerton returned to Portugal. He stayed until May of 
the same year, collecting information for a second book. This visit was 
financially supported by the Portuguese Embassy in London and was 
organized by the National Propaganda Secretariat. It was after this trip that 
Colonel Egerton started to write scripts for the Portuguese Service on his return 
to London. Later on, he completed a new book on the Estado Novo, published 
immediately after the Azores Agreement in 1943, and titled Salazar, the 
Rebuilder of Portugal. 
The presence of Colonel Egerton inside the Portuguese Section was 
very convenient for the Portuguese authorities. Not only were his scripts 
flattering to the Salazar regime but he also kept the Portuguese Embassy 
informed of what was happening inside the BBC and even inside the Ministry of 
Information, with which he also maintained regular contact.  
Notwithstanding the good relations that the Estado Novo authorities 
maintained with members of the BBC Portuguese Service, the broadcasts 
earned the trust of the majority of the local listeners and were considered a 
highly credible source. Its success is confirmed in several reports assessing the 
Service’s effectiveness, produced by the Foreign Office and the BBC (Ribeiro, 
2005, p. 218).6 The reports’ conclusions are reinforced by a number of sources; 
for example, Artur Agostinho, one of the most popular Portuguese announcers 
who worked for several Lisbon radio stations during the war: 
 
The BBC had a large audience. It had a lot of impact. It was 
listened to a lot. [...] German broadcasts never had a large 
audience and had, compared to the BBC, much less influence. 
[...] The BBC was deemed to be the “voice of truth”. [...] It had a 
great deal of credibility. [...] BBC meant “you can believe it” and 
the BBC’s impact was very different to that of the German 
broadcaster which, as a matter of fact, was hardly listened to in 
Portugal (Artur Agostinho, interview, 9 June 2006). 
 
This trust was somewhat displaced because the Portuguese 
Ambassador actually succeeded in some of his attempts to interfere in the 
editorial line of the broadcasts. Not only did he demand, more than once, that 
the BBC flattered Salazar and his regime, but he also suggested that news 
concerning Russia and the Eastern front should not receive much attention on 
the broadcasts to Portugal:  
 
The general tone and atmosphere of the references to the Soviet 
Union gave an impression of sympathy towards the Soviet Union 
which Portuguese opinion found difficult to understand. They 
realised that Great Britain should do everything possible to help a 
nation which was fighting their enemy; but Great Britain was not a 
communist country and the Prime Minister had said that he 
withdrew none of the things he had said against communism, 
nevertheless our broadcasts seemed to imply a deep feeling not 
merely for Russia, but for communist Russia (Minute of a 
conversation between Monteiro and Strang, 1 October 1941, 
National Archives, FO 371/26819). 
 
Sir Ronald Campbell also wrote several letters to the Foreign Office in 
which he warned of the consequences that too much news on Russia might 
have on Salazar’s relations with the British authorities in Portugal. Sir Ronald 
had also advised the Foreign Office to make arrangements to prevent the BBC 
from addressing issues that would irritate Salazar. One of his recommendations 
was that the word “democracy” should not be aired on the Portuguese Service:  
  
Above all in all broadcast talks we must avoid the word 
“democracy”. It is interpreted here as an incitement to the forces of 
disorder (Letter from Campbell to Strang, 12 May 1941, National 
Archives, FO 371/26818). 
 
The Portuguese Service had the difficult task of balancing the defence of 
democracy and British values with the need to not create a diplomatic crisis 
with the Lisbon government. This balance that the BBC tried to achieve was a 
difficult one. On several occasions talks that had been broadcast on other 
European services concerning international current affairs were edited for 
transmission on the Portuguese Service (BBC Survey of European Audiences 
– Portugal, 30 September 1943, BBC Written Archives, E2/198). The specific 
need to preserve good relations with the Lisbon regime also led the station not 
to broadcast several items referring to social instability or disturbances that 
took place in Portugal during the war years. 
Thus, although some criticisms from Armindo Monteiro were directly 
resisted, (Letter from F.O. to Kirkpatrick (BBC), 29 October 1941, BBC Written 
Archives, E2/490) after the Armando Cortesão crisis, the Foreign Office and the 
Ministry of Information did produce a “Guiding Line for Broadcasts to Portugal” 
which made a clear recommendation for the Service to avoid selecting items 
that would be “gratuitously offensive to the Portuguese government or 
Portuguese listeners or which could be interpreted as interference in 
Portuguese internal affairs” (BBC internal “Guiding line for Broadcasts to 
Portugal”, 7 November 1941, National Archives, FO 371/26819). Moreover, 
British diplomacy now paid attention to the political orientation of the current 
members of the Service. Diplomats were fearful that some of the staff would be 
critical of Salazar. However, the Foreign Office was placated by the Foreign 
Adviser of the BBC, Ivone Kirkpatrick, who assured it that those working at the 
Portuguese Service were “mainly in sympathy of Salazar” (Letter from 





The BBC Portuguese Service was attentively monitored by the Lisbon 
authorities, who, from the beginning, tried to influence content as much as 
possible, by suggesting people to be employed as staff and by cultivating close 
relations with many of those who worked for the Service. The Portuguese 
Ambassador in London was very focused on the BBC broadcasts. Besides 
being invited to speak at the microphone on a number of occasions, he 
regularly complained about the service’s editorial line and his remarks were 
discussed inside the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information. 
In October 1941, when the rumour spread that a Portuguese political 
exile would be put in charge of the BBC’s broadcasts to Portugal, Salazar used 
that case to pressurise the Corporation into returning to a path more favourable 
to his own regime. The Portuguese government used the Armando Cortesão 
case as a pretext to instruct the press not to publish any news from British 
sources and to impose strong control over propaganda activities throughout the 
country. The situation became unbearable for the British Embassy and it did not 
take long for Cortesão’s dismissal to be recommended by the Foreign Office, 
proving that Salazar’s policy of infiltration and influence received the blessing of 
the British government on several occasions. 
The Cortesão crisis led to the adoption of new guidelines for the 
Portuguese Service, which clearly stated that news should not be offensive to 
the Lisbon government and that flattery of Salazar was once again 
recommended. By creating a direct relationship between the level of freedom 
given to British propaganda and their own satisfaction with the news and talks 
aired by the Portuguese Service, the Portuguese regime managed to interfere 
in the content of the broadcasts and ensured that the BBC did not become 
critical of the Estado Novo.  
 Salazar’s indirect interference in the BBC through the Foreign Office 
clearly reveals the existence of a central paradox in the Portuguese Service. 
Promoted and trusted by listeners for being truthful in opposition to the German 
broadcasts, the BBC was actually infiltrated and influenced by the Salazar 
regime and, on several occasions, trimmed its output to meet considerations 
imposed by the Foreign Office.  
The BBC’s factual reporting might have been less tainted than any other 
source available to the Portuguese, but it was less independent than listeners 
believed. Crucially, the BBC’s potential as a voice for democracy was not 
pursued. In fact, contrary to the wishes of those who in Portugal listened to the 
BBC and expected the British to impose democracy in the country after the war, 
this was not the policy of the Foreign Office. Far from falling at the end of the 
war Salazar remained in power for decades. The BBC Portuguese Service was 
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1
 At the start of the nineteen thirties, before becoming a dissident of the Estado Novo, Armando 
Cortesão held the post of Agent General of the Colonies, and was appointed Commissioner of 
the Portuguese Colonial Section at the International, Colonial, Maritime and Flemish Art 
Exhibition in Antwerp. 
2
 During the summer of 1938 Jaime and Armando Cortesão were both among those who put 
“Plan L” into motion. This plan consisted of reassembling all the military personnel exiled in 
Spain in order to initiate an operation to invade Portugal. This would supposedly take place with 
the help of the Spanish republican forces. Nevertheless, the advance of Franco in the Spanish 
civil war along with the USSR’s condemnation of the operation frustrated the invasion plan. The 
preparation of the operation had been carefully monitored by the PVDE, who controlled 
informers among the exiles
 
(Oliveira, 1987, pp. 275-278). 
3
 These rumours are mentioned in several documents, namely: telegram from Salazar to 
Monteiro, 22 October 1941, Historic Diplomatic Archive, M.143 CP and letter from Monteiro to 
Salazar, 16 September 1941, in Rosas et al., 1996, p. 184 
4
 Salazar never questioned the Anglo-Portuguese alliance which ensured the British 
government’s discreet support for his dictatorship. (Pinto, 2005, p. 29). 
5
 There are several letters in which Armindo Monteiro speaks of Colonel Egerton as a friend of 
the Portuguese regime (Letters from Monteiro to Salazar, Historic Diplomatic Archive, M.97 CP). 
6
 The BBC’s success is confirmed by several sources namely: internal report of the Foreign 
Office, 1944, National Archives, FO 371/39616; letter from the Ministry of Information to 
Cadogan (F.O.), 18 September 1940, National Archives, FO 371/24493; report from Winch, 
January 1943, National Archives, FO 371/34691; BBC Survey of European Audiences– 
Portugal, BBC Written Archives, E2 198. 
 
 
